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It is a well-known fact that the drug-related violence in 
Mexico has seen an upsurge in recent year. This increase in 
violent crimes has been attributed to the so-called “war 
against drug trafficking” which was declared when President 
Felipe Calderón took office in 2006. From 2006 to 2010 there 
have been around 30,000 drug-related deaths in Mexico –10% of 
which are considered civilian casualties.
1
 As a result, 
Mexicans have been fleeing away from areas where the conflict 
between drug cartels or between drug lords and the Mexican 
army has been more intense. International migration is 
certainly an attractive option, especially for those living 
closer to the border. This paper aims at documenting the 
effect of drug-related violence on immigration to the United 
States, as well as characterizing the new immigrants. 
 
Previous literature has shown that violence caused by civil 
conflicts forces people to migrate to safer locations. The 
Colombian case is particularly interesting since it shares 
many characteristics with the Mexican experience. Ibáñez and 
Vélez (2008) have documented that the drug-related crime and 
violence forced Colombians to migrate to safer locations 
within Colombia. Wood et al. (2010) find evidence that crime 
victimization in Latin America induces people to seriously 
think about moving to the United States.  
 
Therefore it is not surprising that Mexicans exposed to drug-
related violence are fleeing away from the conflict zones and 
that they are finding in the United States a safe haven. This 
phenomenon has been publicized in the American news media: 
the U.S. cities in the southern border have seen a relative 
increase of middle-class Mexican migration. These new 
migrants have established new businesses in the United States 
(Becker 2009; Campoy 2009; Sheridan 2011), and are therefore 
different from the archetypical Mexican migrants.  
 
To my knowledge there is no rigorous research documenting 
this forced migration all across the US-Mexico border. This 
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paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. The 
objective of the paper is twofold. First, it will provide 
evidence of the changes in demographics along the US-Mexican 
border. Using data from Mexican administrative records of 
death certificates and the American Community Survey (ACS) 
from 2000 to 2010 I will document how the upsurge in 
violence, as measured by homicide rates, led to an increase 
of immigrants in the southern border states of the United 
States.  And second, will also document if there are changes 
in the openings of business in the counties along the US 
border using data from self-employment in the ACS and data 
from the Country Business Patterns. The working hypothesis in 
this case is that Mexican migrants transfer their businesses 
to the United States or that they simply open businesses in 
the US to make a living.  
 
Data Description 
 
In both the descriptive and econometric analysis we use data 
from many different sources. Homicide rates are estimated as 
the homicide cases per 100,000 people in the municipality. 
Homicide cases come from death certificates and are identi-
fied by the cause of death. Population data comes from the 
2000, 2005 and 2010 Mexican Census of Population conducted by 
the National Statistical Institute (INEGI for its Spanish 
acronym). The population of years in between surveys was 
estimated using a constant population growth rate. Homicide 
rates are weighted by the square root of the distance between 
Mexican municipalities and U.S. counties. Geographical data 
was obtained from both INEGI and the Census Bureau. 
 
In order to characterize Mexican immigrants in the United 
States, we use the 2000 Census of Population and the 2005 to 
2010 American Community Surveys.
2
 Finally, the data on 
businesses comes from the County Business Patterns series 
compiled by the Census Bureau.
3
  
 
Violence and Changes in Mexican Immigration 
 
We will first document the rise in homicide rates in Mexico. 
Figure 1 presents the trends in homicide rates since 2000. 
Each of the panels in the figure compares homicide rates 
according to how close they are to the border. Panel A 
compares the municipalities in the northern-border states 
(denoted with a 1) with those in non-border states (denoted 
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by 0). It is easily verifiable that there has been a marked 
increase in the homicide rates all over Mexico since 2008, 
but particularly in the northern-border states: by 2010 the 
mean homicide rates in the northern states was about 37 
homicides per 100,000 people, whereas in the rest of the 
country it was around 21 homicides per 100,000 people.  
 
Figure 1. 
Trends in homicide rates along the Mexico-US border 
Panel A. Panel B. 
  
Panel C. Panel D. 
  
 
Panel B, C and D in Figure 1 look more closely at the 
homicide rates in municipalities near the border. The trend 
observed in Panel A is mostly dominated by the violence 
exerted in municipalities closer to the border. Panel B 
compares municipalities in a radius of 150 miles from the 
border, Panel C in a radius of 75 miles, and Panel D in a 
radius of 25 miles. As we get closer to the border the 
homicide rates show an increasing pattern since 2008. For 
instance, Panel D shows that municipalities within 25 miles 
from the border have a homicide rate of around 125 homicides 
per 100,000 people, while the rest of the municipalities in 
Mexico exhibit a homicide rate of less than 25. That is, the 
mean homicide rate in “border municipalities” is more than 5 
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times higher than the mean homicide rate in the rest of the 
country in 2010. Moreover, the mean homicide rate in these 
“border municipalities” has seen a tenfold increase since 
2000.  
 
Given these figures, it is not surprising that Mexicans are 
fleeing away from the border area. According to Mexico’s 
Census of Population figures, in 2000 only about 9.5 percent 
of Mexicans migrating within the country came from border 
states: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo 
León and Tamaulipas. By 2010, almost 24 percent of Mexico’s 
internal mobility was originated in the border states. 
Unfortunately, the census does not allow us to identify 
households that migrated to the United States. In order to 
characterize those immigrants, we will first present 
descriptive statistics of Mexican immigrants in the United 
States using data from the 2000 US Census of Population, and 
the 2005 and 2010 American Community Surveys. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Mexican immigrants: Border 
vs. non-border states 
 
Non-border states Border states 
 
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Age: 0 to 20 0.3742 0.2891 0.2613 0.4158 0.3552 0.3136 
Age: 21 to 35 0.4946 0.5350 0.5476 0.4388 0.4766 0.4362 
Age: 36 to 64 0.1035 0.1387 0.1535 0.1012 0.1264 0.1600 
Female 0.3757 0.3870 0.4088 0.4468 0.4422 0.4734 
Married 0.3836 0.4138 0.3534 0.3714 0.4093 0.3583 
Self-employed 0.0272 0.0351 0.0499 0.0554 0.0786 0.0787 
Salaried 0.9728 0.9649 0.9501 0.9446 0.9214 0.9213 
Secondary 0.2457 0.3095 0.2992 0.1953 0.2277 0.2342 
High School 0.0358 0.0412 0.0466 0.0337 0.0400 0.0638 
College 0.0331 0.0357 0.0426 0.0268 0.0358 0.0589 
Notes: Author's estimates using the 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population, and the 2005 and 2010 American Community Surveys. 
All quantities represent proportions of the characteristic 
specified.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of recent Mexican 
immigrants in the United States. Here recent immigrants are 
defined as those who migrated less than 5 years prior to the 
survey.  The first trend that stands out is that Mexican 
migrants are older in 2000 than they were in 2010. Mexicans 
in the southern border states (California, Arizona, New 
Mexico and Texas) have a different age structure than those 
in the rest of the U.S. We also find that a higher proportion 
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of immigrants are females over time. Surprisingly, and 
contrary to the anecdotal evidence telling that wealthy 
families are the ones fleeing violence, over time less 
migrants were married in 2010 than in 2005, and the border 
exhibits only a slightly higher proportion of married 
immigrants.  
 
A recurring argument in the media is not only than wealthy 
families are migrating, but that they are establishing 
businesses or otherwise investing in the United States. In 
this respect, we found that the proportion of self-employed 
immigrants has increased since 2000, and it has always been 
higher in the border states. However the proportion increased 
by more in non-border states than in border states suggesting 
that businessmen are in fact establishing their economic 
activities away from the border and no in the border cities 
as the media suggests. 
 
Another way to find evidence of a wealthier-than-average 
immigrant is to look at the educational structure. The last 
three rows in Table 1 present the proportion of immigrants by 
schooling level, where college denotes those who attended 
college or more. The statistics present evidence that 
immigrants are now better educated than in 2000, but also 
that there was a large influx of college educated immigrants 
in the border states. So at least in the border, we do find 
some evidence of a changing face of Mexican immigrants. 
 
When we take a closer look to the border,
4
 we find that the 
population of Mexican migrants in those areas is getting 
older, but more so the closer they live to the border. A 
larger percentage of migrants are female as we move towards 
the border. These figures are strikingly different to those 
found in non-border states: the percentage of female migrants 
in counties within 25 miles from the border is larger than 50 
percent in 2010, whereas it is only around 40 percent in non-
border states that same year. The percentage of self-employed 
increased more in those counties within 75 miles from the 
border, but the increase is still lower than that observed in 
non-border states. Finally, we find evidence that Mexican 
immigrants living closer to the border are much better 
educated suggesting that wealthier-than-average Mexicans did 
migrate close to the border after 2005. 
We also estimated the growth rates of businesses in border 
and non-border states.
5
 Contrary to our previous findings on 
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self-employment, the growth rate of business establishments 
has indeed been larger in border-states than the rest of the 
United States. The growth rate of businesses in the border 
has been more than 50 percentage points higher, despite the 
effects of the Global Recession of 2008. 
 
In order to strengthen these findings, we estimated the 
following regression:  
 
                                                         (1) 
 
where     is the logarithm of the outcome of interest in 
county j and year t;          is the logarithm of homicide 
rate weighted by distance to Mexican municipalities within 
150 miles from the border;        is an indicator variable of 
counties in border states;       is the logarithm of the 
unemployment rate;    are county fixed effects which control 
for county characteristics are time-invariant; and    are 
year fixed effects which control for the overall health of 
the U.S. economy. The outcomes of interest will be the number 
of Mexicans who migrated in the year prior to the survey, and 
the number of business establishments. These outcomes will 
also be restricted to either migrants’ characteristics or the 
employment size of the establishment. 
 
The working hypothesis in this paper is that immigrants 
tended to flee to places relatively close to the border, 
given that this type of migration is “facilitated” by Border 
Crossing Cards. So we would expect the parameter   to the 
positive. Table 2 presents the results of the estimation on 
the number of Mexicans who migrated in the year prior to the 
survey. The parameter on the interaction term is always 
positive when it is statistically significant. In column one 
for instance, we find that a 1 percent increase in the 
homicide rate leads to around a 0.14 percent decrease in 
migration, but to a 0.68 percent increase of Mexican 
immigrants to the border. Analogously, we find that a 1 
percent increase in homicide rates in Mexico leads to a 2 
percent increase of college-educated Mexican immigrants, and 
a 0.51 percent increase of secondary-educated Mexican 
immigrants to the border. As expected, the unemployment rate 
has a negative effect on migration. 
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Table 2. Effect of violence on Mexican migration to U.S. 
southern border states 
Dependent variable: 
Last year's Mexican immigrants 
Total 
Self-
employed 
Education level 
College 
High 
School 
Secondary 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Homicide rate -0.1398 -1.0227 -1.8887 -0.1099 -0.4769** 
 
[0.2062] [1.2021] [1.1921] [1.6735] [0.1997] 
Border dummy * Homicide 
rate 0.7249*** 0.6395 2.0315* -0.0312 0.5162* 
 
[0.2548] [1.2138] [1.2072] [1.6826] [0.2859] 
Unemployment rate -0.7894*** 0.0104 -0.2154 -0.1622 -0.4391** 
 
[0.2516] [0.1149] [0.1362] [0.1293] [0.1969] 
Constant 1.0448 0.5999* 0.0519 0.2906 0.5609 
  [0.6983] [0.3255] [0.3962] [0.3738] [0.5531] 
Observations 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 
R-squared 0.636 0.447 0.527 0.485 0.561 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Dependent and explanatory variables are in 
logarithms. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effect found in the previous table could be the result of 
spurious correlation between homicide rates and migration 
inflows into the United States. In order to test for that, we 
estimated equation (1) using the death rate from internal 
causes instead of homicide rates (homicide is an external 
cause of death) as a “fake experiment”.6 We find that the 
effect disappears when we used this other explanatory 
variable. We also estimated equation (1) using inflows of 
Americans and non-Mexicans. As expected, we found that 
homicide rates in Mexico do not have any effect on geographic 
mobility of those two groups. We think these findings provide 
evidence that the results presented in Table 2 are not a 
consequence of spurious correlation. 
 
Table 3 tests whether there is an effect of homicides in 
Mexico on the number of business establishments in the United 
States. Surprisingly and contrary to our findings in the 
descriptive section, we find that violence did not spur a 
boom of business openings in the border states, but all over 
the United States. In any case, the interaction term is 
negative which means that the average effect of homicides on 
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business openings in border states is lower than the average 
effect on the United States as a whole. 
 
Table 3. Effect of Mexican violence on the number of 
business establishments in southern U.S. border 
Dependent variable 
Number of business establishments 
Total 
Employment size 
1 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Homicide rate 0.0223 0.0080 0.0545*** 0.0513*** 0.0296* 
 
[0.0143] [0.0122] [0.0187] [0.0148] [0.0165] 
Border dummy * Homicide 
rate -0.0117 0.0011 -0.0416** -0.0386** -0.0212 
 
[0.0145] [0.0124] [0.0191] [0.0151] [0.0178] 
Unemployment rate 
-
0.0125*** -0.0033 -0.0091* 
-
0.0237*** 
-
0.0347*** 
 
[0.0033] [0.0036] [0.0047] [0.0052] [0.0059] 
Constant 
10.6428**
* 
10.0343**
* 9.0082*** 8.5694*** 8.1491*** 
  [0.0090] [0.0101] [0.0128] [0.0145] [0.0165] 
Observations 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Dependent and explanatory variables are in 
logarithms. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
The regression results confirmed some of our findings on the 
descriptive analysis: the upsurge in violence in Mexico did 
produce a spur of immigration to the states in the southern 
U.S. border. However it also conduced to more business 
openings in the United States with no greater effect in the 
southern border states as suggested in both the media and the 
descriptive analysis. 
 
These results have very important implications for both 
Mexico and the United States. First, we found college-
educated people are fleeing away from violence in Mexico. 
This type of immigration amounts to a loss of human capital 
in Mexico, which is still relatively scarce as compared to 
developed nations. Second, we found that homicide rates have 
spurred a boom of businesses along the border, and all over 
the United States. To Mexico, this result means that 
investment is flying away from Mexico and into the United 
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States. All in all, Mexico is losing both human and physical 
capital due to the upsurge in violence generated by the war 
on drugs. According to growth theories in economics, these 
losses will eventually hamper economic growth in Mexico. 
Mexico’s loss is however the United States’ gain. 
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